I conducted a controlled lab experiment to test to what extent expectations and the status quo determine the reference point. In the experiment, I explicitly manipulated stochastic expectations and exogenously varied expectations in different groups. In addition, I exogenously varied the time of receiving new information and tested whether individuals adjust their reference points to new information, and the speed of the adjustment. With this design, I jointly estimated the reference points and the preferences based on the reference points. I find that both expectations and the status quo influence the reference point but that expectations play a more important role. Structural estimation suggests that the model of the stochastic reference point fits my data better than that with expected utility certainty equivalent as the reference point. The result also suggests that subjects adjust reference points quickly, which further confirms the role of expectation as reference point.
Introduction
prospect theory is well documented in the economic and psychology literature. In this theory, the evaluation of an outcome is influenced by how it compares to a reference point, the degree of diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting. What determines a reference point is an important and open question for discussion. The status quo is one candidate for the reference point, which implies that individuals are reluctant to give up things they currently possess. Alternatively, expectations are taken to be reference points (Koszegi and Rabin 2006, 2007) , meaning that individuals are reluctant to fall short of their beliefs. These theories about reference point determination have different implications due to loss aversion below reference point.
In the theories of expectation-based reference points, there are two lines of literature.
One line of literature is the determination of certainty-equivalent reference points in models of Disappointment Aversion (DA) (Bell 1985 ; Loomes and Sugden 1986; Gul 1991) . In DA models, the reference point is modeled as the expected utility certainty equivalent of a gamble.
The outcome is evaluated by comparing it to a fixed number which equals the expected utility certainty equivalent. Another line is the determination of stochastic reference distributions in the more recent models of Koszegi and Rabin (KR) (2006, 2007) . In the KR model the reference point is the full distribution of expected outcomes. The outcome is evaluated by comparing it with each expected outcome and then integrating over the distribution of expected outcome. This paper tests to what extent expectations and the status quo determine the reference point based on different theoretical implications. I conducted a controlled lab experiment in which I explicitly manipulated expectations and exogenously varied expectations in different groups. I first randomly split the sample into the control group and the treatment group. Then I sent information to these groups in an email 24 hours before the experiment. For the control group, the email said that they will receive a fixed amount of payment for the experiment. For the treatment groups, the email said that they will receive a lottery as payment. When the subjects were in the lab, the treatment groups would play a lottery. Then both the control group and the treatment group would answer 60 risk-attitude questions to elicit their risk attitudes following the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. The difference between the two groups will help to identify the role of expectations and the status quo as reference point. In particular, I explicitly manipulated expectations to be stochastic so that I could shed light on the distinctions between DA model and KR models.
I also explored the second source of variation: I exogenously varied the time of receiving new information and tested whether individuals assimilated new information into their reference points, and if so, at what rate. I randomly split the overall treatment group into two groups: the "no-waiting" treatment group and the "waiting" treatment group. The "no-waiting" group answered the questions immediately after they discovered the realization of the lottery. The "waiting" group filled out a survey about their social economic background after they knew the realization of the lottery, and then-after a few minutes-answered the questions. The key difference was that the waiting group risk attitudes were elicited five minutes later than the no-waiting group. This second source of variation further identified the role of expectation as reference point because the timing of new information does not influence the status quo. I also varied the payoffs and probabilities in the questions measuring risk attitudes so that I could use MLE to jointly estimate the reference points and the preferences based on the reference points.
I find that those who have higher expectations are less risk averse, and those who have lower expectations are more risk averse. The estimated reference points from MLE are higher in the group with higher expectations. These results suggest that expectations play a role to determine the reference point. I also find small diminishing sensitivity, significant loss aversion, and significant nonlinear probability weighting.
To investigate the relative importance of expectations and the status quo, I nested the two models and estimated the weight on each model. I find that the weight on expectation is 0.71, which suggest that both expectations and the status quo determine the reference point but expectations play a more important role.
To compare the model of the certainty-equivalent reference point with that of the stochastic reference point, I explicitly manipulated expectations to be stochastic. The structural estimation suggests that the model of the stochastic reference point fits my data better than that of the certainty-equivalent reference point.
I also exogenously varied the time of receiving new information and tested whether individuals adjust new information into their reference points and the speed of the adjustment. I nested the model of full adjustment and that of no adjustment, and estimated the weight on each model. The weight on the model of full adjustment is 0.54, which suggests that subjects adjust reference points quickly.
My work contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it provides evidence on the question "What determines the reference point?" I test to what extent expectations and the status quo play a role. Many previous empirical research assumed the status quo, lagged status quo as the reference point or treated reference points as latent variables in different contexts.
2 In some recent research, reference points are treated as expectations in the context of taxi drivers labor supply (Doran 2007; Crawford and Meng 2011) , large stake risky choices (Post et al. 2008) , insurance choices (Barseghyan et al. 2011) , professional golf (Pope and Schweitzer 2011) and competition in a real effort sequential-move tournament (Gill and Prowse 2010) . This paper differs from the above in that I exogenously manipulate expectations and expectations are induced to be stochastic.
There are related laboratory experiments that also explicitly manipulate subjects' expectations, and then check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision (Abeler et al. 2011) or valuation for some products (Smith 2008; Ericson and Fuster 2010; Heffetz and List 2012) . The findings of most papers are consistent with reference-dependent models and support the notion that reference points are expectations. There is one exception: Heffetz and List (2012) manipulate subjects' expectations about owning a product and find the endowment effect. But the effect is unlikely to be due to expectations as reference points.
This paper is similar with regard to the manipulation, but differs in the following aspects: first, this paper studies whether the manipulation of expectations influences risk attitudes, not effort provision or valuation. Second, expectations were manipulated as stochastic, and reference points were modeled as certainty equivalent and stochastic in structural estimation. Moreover, I exogenously varied the time of receiving new information, which further identifies the role 2 For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , and Tanaka et al. (2010) assume the status quo as reference point in their lab experiments. Reference points are assumed to be lagged status quo (purchase price) for small investors (Odean 1998 ) and for homeowners (Genesove and Mayer 2001) . In the literature of negative elasticity of labor supply and income targeting, most research treated reference points as latent variables (Camerer et al. 1997; Farber 2005; Fehr and Götte 2007; Farber 2008 As far as I know, this paper is among the first to jointly estimate the reference points and other parameters in utility functions. In the previous research estimating structural parameters in reference-dependent models, reference points are either assumed to be the status quo (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Tanaka et al. 2010) or in a Preferred Personal Equilibrium (Sprenger 2010) or in a Choice-acclimating Personal Equilibrium (Barseghyan et al. 2011) .
3 Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) effect is stronger for recent outcomes than for initial expectations. Gill and Prowse (2010) estimate the adjustment of reference points in a real effort sequential-move tournament. They find that reference points of second mover adjust to their own effort choice quickly, which is consistent with Choice-acclimating Personal Equilibrium. This paper differs in that I not only estimated the speed of adjustment of reference points, but also exogenously varied the time of receiving new information. This second source of variation further identified the role of expectation as reference point and adds more evidence on the adjustment of reference points.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I describe the experimental design. In Section 3, I show the theory model and its implications under different assumptions of reference points. The main empirical results are discussed in Section 4. I estimate the structural model, including the certainty-equivalent reference points and the weights on the stochastic reference points as well as the preferences based on the reference points. I conclude in Section 5.
Experiment Design
The timeline of the experiment is described in Figure 1: [Insert Figure 1] I first randomly split the sample into a control group, "no-waiting" treatment group, and "waiting" treatment group. Then I sent information to these groups in an email 24 hours before the experiment. Control group is randomly split into three subgroups: the $10 control group, the $15 control group and the $20 control group. For the $10 control group, the email says, "During the experiment, you will finish a short survey. After the survey, you will receive $10." For the $15 and $20 control groups, the email says similar information except the amount they are going to receive. For the treatment groups, the email said, "During the experiment, you will finish a short survey. After the survey, you have 1/3 chance to receive $10, 1/3 chance to receive $15, and 1/3 chance to receive $20." When the subjects were in the lab, the treatment groups would play a lottery and then ascertain whether they would receive $10, $15, or $20. Then both the control group and the two treatment groups would answer 60 risk-attitude questions to elicit their risk attitudes following Holt and Laury (2002) procedure (discussed below). In order to test whether subjects would adjust new information into their reference point and how quickly, the overall treatment group was split into two groups:
"no-waiting" and "waiting."
As described in Figure 1 , the "no-waiting" group answers the questions immediately after they discover whether they will receive $10, $15, or $20. The "waiting" group fills out a survey about their social economic background after they know whether they will get $10, $15, or $20, and then-after a few minutes-answers the questions. The key difference is that the waiting group risk attitudes are elicited five minutes later than the no-waiting group.
My design allows me to split all the subjects into 9 groups in the following table.
[Insert Table 1] This approach allowed me to undertake three comparisons about the subjects' risk attitudes. For example, in comparison 1, I compared the risk attitudes among people who receive $10 from Control 1; people who receive $10 from the lottery in the no-waiting treatment; and people who receive $10 from the lottery in the waiting treatment. Since the only differences among the groups were expectations at the time of choice and how long ago (24 hours vs 5 minutes) they were formed, I was able to test whether and how expectations matter.
For comparison 1, I use Tables A1, A2 , and A3 to elicit risk attitudes. For comparisons 2 and 3, the tables are similar (see Appendix). The subjects are told that one of the bet outcomes will be randomly chosen ex post, so that they will report their true risk preference. In the experiment, subjects choose from option 1 and option 2 for each question. For table A1, when the probability of a high payoff increases (moving down the table), a subject should switch from option 1 (riskless option) to option 2 (risky option). The more riskless options the subject takes, the more risk averse the subject is. I use the number of riskless options taken as a measurement of risk aversion. The measurement from Table A1 is "measure 1". After Table   A1 , subjects answer one summary question in Table A4 : "Now you have a choice between (1) Keep the $10 (2) Take the following bet: p% probability to get $15 and (100-p) % probability to get $5. What is the minimum probability p% that you will choose choice option 2?" "Measure 2" is calculated from this summary question. For example, if p=52, then measure 2 is 9 because the subject would take 9 riskless options if he/she answers the questions in Table   1 .
The subject then answers the questions in Table A2 and Table A3 . The measurement from Table A2 is "measure 3". After Table A2 and Table A3 , subjects answer similar summary questions in Table A4 . "Measure 4" and "measure 6" are calculated from these summary questions.
These tables differ in the following way. In Table A1 , I fix the payoff but change the probability in the risky options. In Table A2 , I fix the probability but change the payoff in the risky options. In Table A3 , I fix the risky options but change the riskless options. There are summary questions after Tables A1, A2 and A3. The purpose is to have several measures of subjects' risk attitudes so that I can check the robustness of the results.
Theoretical Framework and Predictions
This section analyzes the predictions of the interventions if expectations determine reference points. In Cumulative Prospect Theory, I employ the specification from Post et al.
: , the weighting function is inverted S-shaped, i.e., individuals overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities, as shown by Tversky and 4 Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) assume that overall utility has two components: consumption utility There are three properties in the utility function: diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting. These properties have the following implications on risk attitudes elicited from Table A1 , A2 and A3. More diminishing sensitivity implies more risk aversion in the gain domain and more risk seeking in the loss domain. More loss aversion implies more risk aversion around the reference point. More nonlinear probability weighting implies more risk aversion in the gain domain and more risk seeking in the loss domain.
All three properties imply more risk seeking in the loss domain than around the kink.
Diminishing sensitivity and nonlinear probability weighting imply more risk averse in the gain domain than around the kink but loss aversion implies less risk averse in the gain domain than around the kink. Therefore, I have hypothesis below.
Hypothesis 1: Those whose reference points are greater than baseline will be less risk averse.
This hypothesis can be tested in comparison 1 when the reference points of subjects in the treatment group are greater than those in the $10 control group. The predication is that those in the treatment group are less risk averse.
Hypothesis 2:
Reference points adjust to the latest information about payoff.
This implies that the risk attitudes of the waiting group should be similar to those of the control group.
I do not have a clear prediction in comparison 3 when the reference points of subjects in the treatment group are less than those in the $20 control group. Those whose reference points are less than baseline might be less risk averse, more risk averse, or equally risk averse. If the effects of diminishing sensitivity and nonlinear probability weighting on risk attitudes are greater than that of los aversion, those in the treatment group are more risk averse. Otherwise, those in the treatment group are less risk averse.
Empirical Results
The experiment was conducted at the Experimental Social Science Laboratory (Xlab) at the University of California, Berkeley. The subjects in the experiment were recruited from undergraduate students. Each experimental session lasted about half an hour. Payoffs were calculated in dollars and the earnings were paid in private at the end of the experimental session.
A total of 396 subjects signed up for the experiments and received emails, and 306 of them actually showed up in 17 sections (see Table A5 for detail). Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the experiment.
[Insert Table 2] The non-show up rate was 22.7%. 6 The non-show up rates for the $10 control group, the treatment group, and the $20 control group were 19.0%, 23.7%, and 21.7%, respectively. The
Wald test shows that I cannot reject the equality of non-show up rates across different groups (p=0.70).
Post surveys show that 84% of subjects expect to get money in the range of my manipulations. In the $10 control group, 66% of subjects expected to get $10, 26% expected to get money between $10 and $15. In the $20 control group, 51% of subjects expected to get $20, 38% expected to get money between $10 and $20. In the treatment group, 95% of subjects expected to get money between $10 and $20. Therefore, subjects expected to get slightly more than my manipulation in the $10 control group and less than my manipulation in the $20 control group. Thus, the effects of expectation from my estimation are likely to be lower bounds.
The comparison between six measures can help to check individual consistency.
According to the design, "measure 1" should be equal to "measure 2" because they are from equivalent questions. 46.4% of total subjects have the same "measure 1" and "measure 2".
For 77.5% of subjects, the difference between "measure 1" and "measure 2" is no more than 2.
The patterns are similar in other measures. 7 These results suggest that the measurements of risk attitudes are consistent cross different measurements.
The Effects of Expectations on Risk Attitudes
The main results are described in the following figures: Table A1 , 11 riskless options in Table A2 and 9 riskless options in Table A3 . In the control group, the average of riskless options taken is 9.70 for Table A1, 12.60 for Table A2 and 8.83 for Table A3 . Thus subjects are risk neutral or slightly risk averse in the control group. In the treatment group, the average of riskless options taken is 8.20 for Table A3 . This suggests that subjects are slightly risk seeking or risk neutral in the treatment group. The results from the above figure show a clear and consistent pattern that losers in the treatment groups are more risk seeking than those in the control group. This is consistent with the theory of reference-dependent utility with expectations as reference points.
[Insert Figure 3 ] Figure 3 shows the cumulative distributions of risk attitudes for those who receive $10 in the three different groups. The horizontal axis stands for the average of all six measures from Holt and Laury tables. The figure shows that the risk aversion of the control group has first-order stochastic dominance over that of the no-waiting group. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the hypothesis that the distribution of risk attitudes in the control group is equal to that in the no-waiting group and it is significant at the 5% level. This is also consistent with the theory of reference-dependent utility with prospect theory value function and expectations as reference points.
[Insert Figure 4 ] Figure 4 shows the risk attitudes for those who received $20 in the control group and the treatment groups. A risk neutral subject should take 9 riskless options in Table A1 , 10 riskless options in Table A2 and 9 riskless options in Table A3 . In the control group, the average of riskless options taken is 11.26 for Table A1, 14.60 for Table A2 and 9.26 for Table A3 . Thus subjects are risk averse in the control group. In the treatment group, the average of riskless options taken is 13.17 for Table A1, 15.34 for Table A2 and 9.14 for Table A3 . This suggests that subjects are also risk averse in the treatment group. The figure shows that winners in the treatment groups are more risk averse than those in the control group.
[Insert Figure 5 ] Figure 5 shows the cumulative distributions of risk attitudes for those who receive $20 in the three different groups. The horizontal axis stands for the average of all six measures from Holt and Laury tables. The figure shows that the risk aversion of the no-waiting group has first-order stochastic dominance over that of the control group. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution of risk attitudes in the no-waiting group is equal to that in the control group (p=0.189).
In order to take into account other controls, I estimate the treatment effect of expectation on risk attitudes through OLS regression. For comparisons 1 and 3, I use the following specification:
where i y is the number of riskless options taken by subject i. Table 1 ), and those who receive $20 from the control group, the no-waiting group, or the waiting group (comparison 3 in Table 1 ). The results for six measures are presented in six columns in Tables 3 and 4. [Insert So these results show a clear and consistent pattern that the losers from the no-waiting group are less risk averse (more risk seeking) than those who receive $10 from the control group. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
The coefficient of i wait T _ for measure 1 is -0.87 and is not significant. The magnitude of 2 β (0.87) is smaller than 1 β (2.18). The possible explanation is that the losers adjust their reference points to the realized payoffs ($10) and thus become more risk averse.
However, the p-value of the Ward test 2 1 β β = is 0.2565 and is not significant. There is thus suggestive evidence that losers in the waiting group are more risk averse than those in the no-waiting group with measure 1. In measures 2 to 6, 2 β is similar to 1 β . So the risk attitudes of losers in the waiting group are similar to those in the no-waiting group. The reason might be that the subjects had to first finish the questions about measure 1, and then
answer the questions about other measures. So there is a time lag between the realization of their lottery and the answers to the questions after measure 1. They had "waited" as if they were in the waiting group.
[Insert Table 4 ] So the winners from the no-waiting group are more risk averse than those who receive $20 from the control group. This suggests that the effects of diminishing sensitivity and nonlinear probability weighting on risk attitudes are greater than that of loss aversion, Section 4.2 will estimate these preference parameters.
Structural Estimation
I have so far learned that expectations influence risk attitudes. This is consistent with expectations-based reference-dependent models. But how expectations might change the utility function is not discussed. There are at least two ways: the reference point could be modeled as a fixed number, which is the expected utility certainty-equivalent. Then outcome is evaluated by comparing it to a fixed number which equals the expected utility certainty equivalent. The reference point could also be modeled as the full distribution of expected outcomes (KR model). Then outcome is evaluated by comparing it with each expected outcome and then integrating over the distribution of expected outcome. In this section, I
estimate these two models to deepen our understanding about different expectations-based models. In particular, I use the detailed choice data to estimate the certainty-equivalent reference points and the weights on the stochastic reference points as well as the preferences based on the reference points.
I can provide insights into the identification of these parameters. The lottery choice task identifies the utility function parameters. The subjects' choices made in Table A3 are used to estimate the curvature of utility function, since I fix the risky options but change the riskless options for all above exogenous reference points. The loss-aversion parameter is estimated using Table 2 , since I fix the probabilities to 50%/50% but change the payoffs in risky options.
The probability weighting parameter is estimated using Table A1 , since I fix the payoffs but change the probabilities in risky options in that table. The experimental manipulation of expectations identifies the reference points in different groups.
To estimate the parameters in the utility function, I use a random-utility model (McFadden 1974 ) with a nonlinear component:
where ε is assumed to be i.i.d. error term and modeled as type I extreme value. The utility is is scaled by 1/σ and the parameter σ is the scale parameter, because it scales the utility to reflect the variance of the unobserved portion of utility.
Suppose the subject is asked to choose between (1) Keep 1 x and (2) take the following bet: p probability to get 2 x and (1-p) probability to get 3
x . Let ) (a U denote the utility as a function of their choices of bets. 1 = a if the subject chooses riskless options (option 1) and 2 = a if the subject chooses risky options (option 2). The probability to choose risky options can be presented by the usual logit formula:
With this formula and the data about subjects' choices, I could use maximum-likelihood estimation to estimate the parameters in the structural model. Given that the underlying logistic model becomes highly nonlinear in the parameters, I code my own estimator in Stata to estimate the parameters and account for potential correlations within clusters. Below, I
consider two expectations-based models: the model of the certainty-equivalent reference points and the model of the stochastic reference points.
The Model of the Certainty-Equivalent Reference Points
According to equation (3) Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5] Column 1 presents the estimation results with all seven parameters. The point estimate of α is 1.18 and it is significantly greater than one at the 1% level. This is not consistent with diminishing sensitivity. The point estimate of λ is 1.86 and it is significantly greater than one at the 1% level. This value of loss aversion is consistent with loss aversion estimates from other contexts (Tversky and Kahneman 1992 ; Gill and Prowse 2010; Pope and Schweitzer 2011) . The point estimate of γ is 0.49 and it is significantly less than one at the 1% level.
The value of γ is lower than estimates from other contexts, which is close to 0.7 (Tanaka et al. 2010; Barseghyan et al. 2010 fits significantly better than the models in columns 2, 3, and 4 at the 1% level. These results suggest that probability weighting, curvature of utility function, and loss aversion all play an important role when the reference point is modeled as expected utility certainty equivalent.
In column 5, I analyze how fast the certainty-equivalent reference points adjust. I assume subjects will put some weight on the utility from new reference points and the rest on the utility from old reference points. The subjects do not adjust reference points if the weight is zero and they fully adjust reference points to new ones if the weight is one. I allow the weights to be different in the no-waiting group (aa1) and the waiting group (aa2). The point estimate of aa1 is 0.48 and of aa2 is 0.63, and both are significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. The positive weight in the no-waiting group suggests that subjects adjust reference points fast. The difference between them is not significant. Thus it is suggestive evidence that the longer they wait, the more they adjust their reference points to updated expectations.
In column 6, I compare the model of certainty-equivalent expectations as reference points with that of the status quo as reference points. I construct two utility functions: In the first function, the reference points are the certainty-equivalent expectations, i.e., rp1=10, rp2 =rp3=rp4=rp5=15, and rp6=20; in the second one, the reference points are the status quo, i.e. all reference points are zero. Then I estimate the weight on expectations. If the weight is larger than 0.5, the model with certainty-equivalent expectations as reference points is better than that with the status quo as reference points. The estimated weight is 0.64 and it is significantly greater than 0.5 at the 5% level. This result suggests that expectations are better than the status quo as reference points in the model of certainty-equivalent reference points.
The Model of the Stochastic Reference Points
In the KR model, the reference point is the full distribution of expected outcomes. For example, subjects expected to receive $10 with 1/3 probability, $15 with 1/3 probability and $20 with 1/3 probability in the no-waiting group. Therefore, the reference points should be stochastic reference points with weights equal to the probability: $10 with 1/3 probability, $15 with 1/3 probability and $20 with 1/3 probability. In KR model, I will estimate σ γ λ α Table 6 .
[Insert In columns 2, 3 and 4, I estimate the models with linear probability weighting, no diminishing sensitivity and no loss aversion, similar to Table 5 . The likelihood ratio tests show that the model in column 1 fits significantly better than the models in columns 2 and 4
at the 1% level. However, column 1 and 3 are similar. These results suggest both nonlinear probability weighting and loss aversion play an important role in the KR model. But the curvature is close to linear.
In column 5, I analyze how fast the stochastic weights on reference points adjust in the similar way to Table 5 . The point estimate of aa1 is 0.40 and of aa2 is 0.54 in the KR model, and both are significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. The positive weight in the no-waiting group suggests that subjects adjust reference points fast. The difference between them is not significant. Thus it is suggestive evidence that the longer they wait, the more they adjust their reference points to new ones.
In column 6, I compare the model of stochastic expectations as reference points with that of the status quo as reference points in the similar way to =rp3=rp4=rp5=15, and rp6=20. Then I estimate the weight on the first model. The estimated weight is 1.00 and it is significantly greater than 0.5 at the 1% level. Therefore, the model of the stochastic reference point fits my data better than that of the certainty-equivalent reference point.
Calibration
I have estimated the parameters and weights on reference points in Table 6 . In this section, I will use the estimated parameters and weights to calibrate subjects' behavior in my experiment. Note I will only consider the control group and the no-waiting group in the calibration. 
Conclusion
What determines a reference point is an important question. This paper provides evidence whether expectations and the status quo determine the reference point. I explicitly manipulated expectations and exogenously varied expectations in different groups. Then I tested whether expectations change subjects' risk attitudes. I find that both expectations and the status quo determine the reference point but expectations play a more important role.
Moreover, the structural estimation suggests that the model of the stochastic reference point fits my data better than that of the certainty-equivalent reference point.
I also exogenously varied the time of receiving new information and tested whether individuals adjust new information into their reference points, and the speed of the adjustment.
I find that subjects can incorporate much new information into reference points in a few minutes, suggesting that subjects adjust reference points quickly. Prior work and this paper suggests that expectation, the status quo, the time of holding previous beliefs and the time of adjusting new information contribute to determine reference points together. Future work should tell these apart, with both field and laboratory evidence.
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The Effect of Expectation on Risk attitudes
Those who receive $10 from the control group Notes: Dependent variable is the number of riskless options taken measured by different tables; standard errors are clustered by each individual. Robust clustered standard errors are in the parentheses. *** significant on 1% level; ** significant on 5% level, * significant on 10% level. Columns 1 to 6 report the results of measures 1 to 6, respectively.
Specification:
Dep. 
The Effect of Expectation on Risk attitudes
Those who receive $20 from the control group Notes: Dependent variable is the number of riskless options taken measured by different tables; standard errors are clustered by each individual. Robust clustered standard errors are in the parentheses. *** significant on 1% level; ** significant on 5% level, * significant on 10% level. Columns 1 to 6 report the results of measures 1 to 6, respectively.
Model:

Constraint:
No constraint Linear probability weighting Table A1 that fixes payoffs but changes probability in risky options. "Measure 2" is calculated from the question (for comparison 1) "Now you have a choice between (1) Keep the $10 (2) Take the following bet: p% probability to get $15 and (100-p) % probability to get $5.
What is the minimum probability p% that you will choose choice 2?" For example, if p=52, then measure 2 is 9 because the subject would take 9 riskless options if he/she answer the questions in Table 1 . "Measure 3" is derived from Table A2 that fixes the probability to 50%/50% but change payoffs in risky options. "Measure 4" is similar to measure 2 but calculated from the question (for comparison 1) "Now you have a choice between (1) Keep the $10 (2) Take the following bet: 50% probability to get $X and 50% probability to get $5. What is the minimum X that you will choose choice 2?". "Measure 5" is derived from Table A3 that fixes the risky options but change the riskless options. "Measure 6" is similar to measure 2 and 4, but calculated from the question (for comparison 1) "Now you have a choice between (1) Keep $X (2) Take the following bet: 50% probability to get $10 and 50% probability to get $20. What is the minimum X that you will choose choice 1?" Table A3 I change the payoffs in riskless options. For each question in a row, subjects are asked to choose between option 1 and option 2. Subjects cannot see the expected payoff difference.
Summary Questions
After Table A1 Now you have a choice between (1) Keep the $10 (2) Take the following bet: p% probability to get $15 and (100-p) % probability to get $5. What is the minimum probability p% that you will choose choice option 2?
After Table A2 Now you have a choice between (1) Keep the $10 (2) Take the following bet: 50% probability to get $X and 50% probability to get $5. What is the minimum X that you will choose choice 2?
After Table A3 Now you have a choice between (1) Keep $X (2) Take the following bet: 50% probability to get $10 and 50% probability to get $20. What is the minimum X that you will choose choice 1? Table A 
